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Chapter 1: Introduction

Wan Yanhai is the most-famous AIDS activist in China and the director of
Beijing Aizhixing Institute of Health Education, a non-governmental organization
(“NGO”) that aims at increasing China’s awareness about HIV/AIDS and advocates on
the rights and interests of those infected with HIV/AIDS in China.
Three years ago during an interview with Wan Yanhai in his Beijing office, I had
an unexpected encounter. Three farmers that were HIV positive came into his office, all
looking exhausted and miserable. Upon the sight of Wan Yanhai, they started rushing
their words out altogether uncontrollably, in an accent familiar to my ears. To my
surprise, they told me that they came from the same city I lived in. They got affected by
AIDS in a hospital through unclean blood transfusion, and the local court would not
accept their case when they tried to sue the hospital. After hearing about Wan Yanhai and
the assistance Aizhixing offered, they saved enough money and travelled to Beijing in
despair because they could not even afford medical care. They tried to win Wan’s
sympathy and support to sue the hospital. However, Wan warned them to be careful
because they might get into trouble going against the government. It was shocking for me
to see that appalling injustice was taking place in my hometown. At the same time, I was
fascinated by the emerging grassroots organization under the umbrella of the powerful
authoritarian government. Although the cautious manners of Wan suggested that the
NGO’s activities were partially underground to avoid detention from the government, its
scope of influence within the society was expansive.
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The encounter typified a latent trend that China increasingly became a strong
advocate of grassroots activism, though the Chinese government was not known for its
commitment to democratic transition. The prevalence of social organizations in an
authoritarian regime challenges the conventional approaches to the relationship between
“civil society” and democracy. It is without a doubt that the interest in civil society has
increased over the past decade following the Third Wave of Democratization, which
started in 1974 in Portugal and spread over to Latin America and communist Central and
Eastern Europe in the 1990’s. Civil society was regarded by the liberal dissidents in
Eastern Europe and progressive democrats in Latin America as a space of contending
political interests and thus often related to democratization. The number of social
organizations registered at the Ministry of Civil Affairs has increased almost onehundred-fold in the two decades since 1988. Evidently it suggests increasing social
involvement in various sectors, undertaking functions previously controlled by the state.
However, how much truth does it entail? Neoliberal rhetoric on international
development regards civil society as an apolitical field where social groups work with
government and market forces to improve governance. Therefore, unlike the early
champions of civil society in Eastern Europe and Latin America, the neoliberals link civil
society more to modernization and governance than democracy.
In China, however, we see both the social organizations that work with the
government but also, emerging NGOs such as Wan Yanhai’s Aizhixing that choose to
advocate marginalized political interests. It thus makes me wonder – are social groups
organizing at the grassroots level leading to some degree of democratization in China?
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What is the relationship between civil society and democratization exemplified by China?
The thesis aims to contribute meaningful answers to this question.
This chapter will start with a critical review of the definition of civil society in
past and contemporary political literature, followed by a discussion of civil society in
relation to democratization both in general and in the case of China.
.

What is Civil Society?
The term “civil society” is not a recent invention in political science. Civil society
originated within the society as a means to involve individuals in political discussions. In
the Classical Age, Greek philosophers grappled with the issues surrounding communal
life given the inherent conflicts between individual needs and societal needs. Socrates
suggested solving the conflicts by public argument using rational dialogues – the most
basic form of a “civil society,” a space for individuals to engage in collective political
discourse voluntarily and informally.
The concept of civil society also dwells on the state-society relations. In Second
Treatise of Civil Government, John Locke states his understanding of “civil society” as a
united body of individuals under the power of an executive that protects their property
and well-being, and designs legislation to govern their behavior. Thomas Hobbes’s “civil
society” is a means for men in the state of nature to escape the state of war and accede to
a social contract. The Hobbesian “civil society” resembles Lockean in that civil society is
not separated from the state but contained within.
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Hegel synthesized the Classical and Enlightenment conceptions of civil society in
his Rechtsphilosophie. Notably, he drew a clear distinction between state and civil society
in a manner that also involved their interpenetration, which marked a big step forward
from the civil society ideology represented by Hobbes and Locke. The separation of civil
society from the realm of the state marked a significant shift in civil society’s role in
mediating state-society relations. In particular, Hegel states that civil society intervenes
between the family and the state: “The whole sphere of civil Society is the territory of
mediation where there is free play for every idiosyncrasy, every talent, every accident of
birth and fortune, and where waves of every passion gush forth, regulated only by reason
glinting through them”1.
Based on Hegel’s thoughts, contemporary political discourse has developed the
concept of civil society with more complexities, first of which dwells on the
independence of civil society from the state. Many more political scientists agree with
Hegel that civil society is separate from the state. Francis Fukuyama defines “civil
society” as the “social structures separate from the state that underlie democratic political
institutions” 2 . Similarly, Seymour Lipset refers “civil society” as “mediating institutions”
including “groups, media, and networks” that “operate independently between
individuals and the state” 3. Ariel Armony introduces a “three-sector” model that consists
of the state, the market, and the “third” sector – the civil society sector – which includes

1

Hegel, G.W.F. “Philosophy of Right”, § 182
Fukuyama, Francis. (1995) “The Primacy of Culture”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6.1, pp. 7-14
3
Lipset, Seymour M. “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address”,
American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 1-22
2
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“voluntary, nonprofit associations”4. The “third” sector associations should be organized,
private, non-profit-distributing, self-governing, and voluntary. Hence, Armony contends
that civil society locates itself independent of the state and market but within the society,
as a loosely defined space where citizens freely associate in social and grassroots political
organizations. Although these arguments indicate that civil society is independent of the
state, the emerging civil society in authoritarian regimes or transition regimes implies that
the presumed division between state and civil society may not be so obvious. Thomas B.
Gold argues that civil society seeks to operate independently of the state and the
communist party in his analysis of resurgence of Chinese civil society5. However, the
Centre for Civil Society at London School of Economics points out that “In theory, its
[civil society’s] institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market,
though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are
often complex, blurred and negotiated” 6.
In particular, Chinese social scientist Yang Tuan uses China as an example to
illustrate how civil society overlaps with the state. In contrast to Armony’s “three-sector”
model, Yang proposes a “four-sector” model to explain Chinese social structure. In
addition to the first sector (the market), the second sector (the government), the third
sector (the voluntary sector), Yang contends that there should be a fourth sector of
“commercial” and “bureaucratic” nature populated by organizations and institutions

4

Armony, Arial C. “The Dubious Link: Civic Engagement and Democratization” , Stanford University
Press, 2004, p. 30
5
Gold, Thomas B. (1990) “Tiananmen and Beyond—The Resurgence of Civil Society in China”, Journal
of Democracy, p. 20
6
Centre for Civil Society, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2004.
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm
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providing public goods and services. The third sector’s financial resources come from
donations whereas the fourth sector from profits. In this way, Yang argues, civil society –
the conventional “third sector” by international standards – is split up into a voluntary
sector and a fourth sector. Unlike civil society organizations in liberal democracies that
form a space to represent marginalized interests and individuals, those in China largely
serve to improve governance rather than advocate political voices. Civil society, therefore,
relates more to governance and modernization than democracy. In fact, Chinese
government encourages and organizes certain civil society associations to work with
government and market forces so as to achieve efficiency in policy implementation.
Moreover, in the case of China, Timothy Brook and Michael Frolic also argue
that it is better to regard civil society as a formation that exists by virtue of state-society
interaction, rather than something between. Frolic introduces the term “state-led civil
society” which is “created from the top down as an adjunct to state power” including
social organizations and quasi-administrative units created by the state to manage the
economy and society. 7 This is similar to Yang’s proposal of constructing a fourth sector
of governance purpose. However, Frolic adds that it might also be just a “temporary
accommodation by the authoritarian state to forces that will overwhelm it soon enough”8.
In sum, the above review of literature shows that civil society is not necessarily
independent of the state. In authoritarian regimes, civil society is interrelated with the
state.

7

Frolic, Michael. “State-led Civil Society”, in “Civil Society in China” edited by Timothy Brook and B.
Michael Frolic. M.E. Sharpe. 1997.Brook et al., p. 48
8
Frolic, p. 48
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On the relationship between state power and civil society development,
Tocqueville says that “a grievance comes to appear intolerable once the possibility of
removing it crosses men’s minds”. In other words, a decline of state power gives rise to
rights consciousness and civil society activity. Similarly, scholars such as Fukuyama and
Minxi Pei argue that the power struggle between the state and civil society is a “zero-sum”
game in that civil society develops more when the state power retreats and vice versa. In
particular, Fukuyama contends that civil society “often bears an inverse relationship to
state power, growing stronger as the state recedes”9, and Pei presents evidence that shows
“falling repression produces greater resistance mainly as a result of rising rights
consciousness among the oppressed”10. However, the relationship between state power
and civil society bears more complexity than “zero-sum”: Civil society and the state can
be both weak/strong at the same time. Vivienne Shue thinks that the state and civil
society have grown stronger together in post-Mao China. In her Book State Power and
Social Organization in China, she argues that “the ongoing decentralization of state
power and the simultaneous deminiaturization of social organization have created some
of the conditions required for both the empowerment of newly rising social forces and the
enhancement of the state’s capacity to govern” 11 . Both the state and society can
eventually emerge “strengthened” by the wrenching processes of renegotiation.
Furthermore, she writes about the intermediate level arenas in Chinese politics where
“the possibility of a convergence of forces will take place in the middle and lower-middle
9

Fukuyama, Francis. “The Primacy of Culture”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6.1, pp. 7-14
Pei, Minxin “Rights and resistance—the changing contexts of the dissident movement”, in “Chinese
Society—Change, conflict and resistance (2nd Edition)”, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 42
11
Shue, Vivienne. “State Power and Social Forces—Domination and transformation in the Third World”,
Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 82
10
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reaches of the Chinese political system is, thus, apparent” 12 . Yang’s “fourth sector”
serves as an example of the “convergence of forces” of state power and social forces.
Therefore, the above critical review of literature suggests that civil society
functions as an intermediate associational realm between the state and individuals,
populated by voluntary social organizations formed to represent their values and interests.
However, I have also shown that civil society is not necessarily engaged in a zero-sum
game with the state – in China, both civil society and the state have strengthened in postMao years. At the same time, no clear boundary exists between civil society and the state.
This is particularly true in authoritarian regimes where states and civil societies overlap.

Civil Society and Democracy

Civil society captures the activities of the social forces at the grassroots level that
promote social changes, either obstructing or facilitating democratization. In this sense,
the study of civil society serves the purpose of examining democratization in a
microscopic perspective.
Robert Putnam is one of the earliest scholars that look at the role of civil society
in democratization. He put forward the concept of “social capital” in his book Making
Democracy Work: Civic Transitions in Modern Italy. In 1970, Italy experienced a drastic
power shift when the national government devolved decision-making power to regional

12

Shue, Vivienne. “State Power and Social Forces—Domination and transformation in the Third World”,
Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 75
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councils, intermediary institutions between the national and local level. Under such
circumstances, Putnam studies and compares the success of the local governments in the
North and the failure in the South, and discovers the importance of social capital in the
modern Italian experiment of building new institutions of democracy. In the North, there
existed “norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement”13 embodied in tower
societies, unions, cooperatives, mutual aid societies and football clubs. Whereas, in the
South, social and political relations were vertically structured missing these “horizontal
civic bonds” that “undergirded levels of economic and institutional performance” 14 .
Hence, Putnam comes to conclude that “civic engagement”, in particular, “a dense
network of secondary associations”15 is important in making the democratic government
work, and that “both states and markets operate more efficiently in civic settings” 16 .
Putnam states that “Tocqueville was right: Democratic government is strengthened, not
weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society”17. Likewise, Jean Louise Cohen asserts
that “Civil society as the source of influence and control of representative political
institutions is the heart of a liberal democracy”18. As the intermediary between the state
and individual family, civil society addresses the issues in a framework that reflects the
changing dynamics of state-society relations.
The role of civil society has been especially heightened during democratic
openings, transitions, and consolidations. The emergence of the Third Wave of
13

Putnam, Robert. “Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy”. Princeton University
Press, 1993. p. 181
14
Putnam, p. 181
15
Putnam, p. 90
16
Putnam, p. 181
17
Putnam, p. 182
18
Cohen, Jean Louise. “Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought”. Routledge, 2001. p. 71
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Democratization inspired many scholars to study civil society in the context of
democratic transitions. The conventional wisdom draws a rather straight line from civil
society to democratization. Fukuyama addresses civil society as the third stage in four
stages of democratic consolidation – “ideology,” “institutions,” “civil society,” and
“culture” by order 19. A healthy civil society, in his view, is the basis for the construction
of democratic institutions. Additionally, Fukuyama incorporates culture in his reasoning
of civil society and democratic consolidation. At a cultural level, he argues, civil society
has precursors and preconditions of factors such as “family structure, religion, moral
values, ethnic consciousness, ‘civic-ness’, and particularistic historical traditions”, any of
which plays a role in determining the way civil society develops and impacts democratic
transition. Furthermore, many argue that civil society is not only conducive but also
indispensable to democratization. Dwelling on similar research perspectives, Lipset
emphasizes “civil society” as a requisite for democracy and discusses the factors as well
as processes affecting the prospects for the institutionalization of democracy worldwide20.
Moreover, Linz and Stepan contend that a consolidated liberal democracy can come into
existence only under the condition of the development of a free and lively civil society as
one of the five arenas. The other four arenas include “a relatively autonomous and valued
political society,” “a rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms and
independent associational life,” “a state bureaucracy useable by the new democratic

19

Fukuyama, Francis. “The Primacy of Culture”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6.1, pp. 7-14
Lipset, Seymour M. “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address”,
American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 1-22
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government,” and “an institutionalized economic society” 21. In regard to the role of civil
society in democratization, Adam Przeworski argues along the same line that democracy
is consolidated only when compliance, which he refers to as “acting within the
institutional framework,”22 constitutes the equilibrium of the decentralized strategies of
all political forces involved. Przeworski shows his conception of civil society contained
within the state framework.
The growth of civil society is said to play a crucial political role in
democratization because it not only checks authoritarian governments and contributes to
the establishment and maintenance of a democratic polity, but also improves the quality
of governance within the polity. From early discussions of the concept of civil society, I
have shown that in authoritarian regimes such as China, civil society is embraced by the
government to improve efficiency and oversee functions previously taken care of by the
state. At the same time, Lipset argues that civil society should be capable of opposing and
countervailing the state power to maintain balance in state-society relations, and it also
serves as the basis of institutionalized political parties which are considered crucial for a
modern democracy. In summary, a vibrant civil society is often seen as a positive social
force that promotes democratic transitions and a necessary pre-condition for
democratization to succeed.
However, is civil society always an unalloyed good thing for democratization? A
closer look at how civil society alters social relations tells us another story. Essentially,
21

Linz, J. J. and Stepan, A. “Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America, and Post-Communist Europe”. Baltimore/London, 1996, pp. 5-7
22
Przeworski, Adam. “Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and
Latin America”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. p. 26
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civil society makes an impact on democratization by altering state-society relations. As
the authoritarian government initiates space for more liberal politics, an active civil
society represents increased political engagement from below in forms of public
contestation and participation – the two dimensions of democracy according to Robert
Dahl23. However, democracy requires not only a combination of the two dimensions, but
also the right direction in which participation and contestation associate. The flourishing
of civil society does not guarantee that it will lead to a liberal democracy. Pluralism at the
bottom, after all, must lead to free and fair regular elections and the protection of citizens’
civil liberties in order for democratic consolidation to take place. Dietrich Rueschemeyer
makes the point that “it is power relations that most importantly determine whether
democracy can emerge, stabilize and then maintain itself even in the face of adverse
conditions”24. Armony points out that civil society realizes its democratic potential only
in certain circumstances, because it is the pattern of conflict and co-operation within the
civil society realm between state and society which more directly relates to the resultant
state-society relations, which determines whether civil society contributes to
democratization or not.
The growth of civil society counter-balances state power, and further creates
potential for democratization. However, in authoritarian regimes, civil society is not
necessarily independent of the state. It is thus ambiguous whether the “state-led” civil
society is also effective in counter-balancing state power and promoting democratization.
Moreover, civil society is used as a rather broad term and it includes social organizations
23

Dahl, Robert A. “Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition”. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich et al., “Capitalist Development and Democracy”. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.
p. 5

24
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that may actually cripple democratization rather than strengthening it. Whether civil
society development leads to democratization or not also largely depends on how the
state incorporates and responds to their demands. In this sense, civil society development
can be motivating for democratization but is not a sufficient condition for it.
Neoliberals embrace the notion that social capital can create negative externalities.
Not all forms of associationalism are positive in their impact on the society as a whole.
Criminal networks, street gangs and intolerant ethnic groups such as Italian mafia and
KKK all draw upon forms of social capital to realize narrow group interests. Mauricio
Rubio refers to such negative forms of associationalism as “perverse social capital” that
stimulates rent-seeking activities and criminal behaviors25. He argues that the deficiencies
in Colombian social capital have led to the persistence of economically inefficient
institutions in the society. Similarly, Alejandro Portes claims that meetings of merchants
ended up as a conspiracy against the public as an example of negative social capital26.
Moreover, in his book The Dubious Link, Ariel Armony uses evidence from Weimar
Germany to show that a dense and vibrant civil society could contribute to the demise of
democracy rather than the strengthening of it. Focusing on a micro-level of average civic
participants, he argues that “civil society may or may not lead to democracy” depending
on the “context in which people associate” rather than the fact that “association is
inherently and universally positive for democracy” 27 . Furthermore, Armony adds that
25

Rubio, Mauricio. “Perverse Social Capital – Some Evidence from Colombia”, Journal of Economic
Issues, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, September 2007. pp. 805 – 815
26
Portes, Alejandro. “Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology”, Annual Review of
Sociology, Vol. 24, (1998), pp. 1 – 24
27
Armony, Arial C. “The Dubious Link: Civic Engagement and Democratization” , Stanford University
Press, 2004, p. 2
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civil society can develop its democratic potential on the condition that it is firmly rooted
in and backed by the rule of law. To conclude, a vibrant civil society activates social
forces to engage in politics, but the engagement can be either conducive or destructive to
democratization. It is therefore debatable whether civil society leads to democratization.
So what factors determine if the development of civil society will lead to democratization?
I will tentatively contend that the political structure of the state in relation to the society
affects the outcome of civil society development.
However ambiguous the relationship between civil society and democratization
might be, evidence has proved that the development of civil society can and often will,
support and sustain democracy. I would argue that the following two characteristics



Civil Society as a “Transmission Belt”

Civil society serves as a “transmission belt” between state and individuals in the
society. It facilitates a two-way communication that conditions the relationship between
individual citizens and the formal political system – “top-down” from state to households
and “bottom-up” from the individuals to the state. On one hand, through organized
activities that reflect government policies, civil society organizations help to pass down
national politics to individuals. Grassroots groups have far-reaching networks into social
sectors that the state cannot take care of. In this way, civil society links the macro-politics
at national level with micro-politics at individual level. On the other hand, civil society
articulates the demands, voices and interests of individuals to the government. The

18

German sociologist Jürgen Habermas looks at the emerging public sphere in 18th century
Europe and sees it as developing out of the private institution of the family, and from
what he calls the "literary public sphere", where discussion of art and literature became
possible for the first time28. Habermas emphasizes the role of the public sphere as a way
for civil society to articulate its interests. Samuel Huntington says that civil society
essentially provides a space for citizens to exercise their “civil and political freedoms to
speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the
conduct of electoral campaigns” 29 . Therefore, civil society serves as a two-way
transmission belt connecting the state and individuals within the society. At the same
time, a vibrant civil society encourages direct political participation complementary to
periodic elections that entail limited political involvement out-reach. Moreover, it can
also economize on the transaction costs of democracy by identifying, “packaging” and
replaying political demands which otherwise might remain dormant and unexpressed. In
addition, civil society not only contributes to democratic accountability, but also acts as a
cushion that mitigates the clash of state interests versus individual interests. In the Third
Wave democratic transitions, civil society played a key role in Communist Eastern
European countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary:

“Hope…lies… [in] the realization of a social order in which the formalized and
functionalized structure of society will be regulated and controlled by this
28

Habermas, Jürgen. “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of
Bourgeois Society”, The MIT Press, 1991.
29
Huntington, Samuel. “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century”. University of
Oklahoma Press, 1991. p. 7
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‘newly discovered’ spontaneous civic activity, which will be a permanent and
essential source of social self-awareness.”30



Civil Society as an Independent Entity from the State

Thanks to its presumed autonomy, civil society is able to play a disciplinary
role in relation to the state by enforcing standards of public morality and performance.
When it is truly independent of the state, civil society serves as an effective social
force checking the unfettered authority of government officials. Due to their
autonomy, actors in civil society are able to represent interests external to the state
and to limit and legitimize state behavior. Habermas points out that the rationalcritical debate taking place in the public sphere checked domination by the state, or
the illegitimate use of power. Furthermore, a vibrant and effective civil society can
successfully re-define the political game rules along democratic lines and play a more
powerful constitutive role, in the sense that certain organizations of civil society see it
in their interest to observe a set of rules of the political game characteristic of
democracy. 31 In this way, civil society creates and sustains a set of new democratic
norms that regulate the behavior of the state and the character of political relations
between state and the individual citizens. Fundamentally, a growing civil society
achieves this goal by altering the balance of power between state and society in favor
30

R. Battek, “Spiritual Values, Independent Initiatives and Politics”, in Vaclav Havel et al., “The Power of
the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe”, London: Hutchinson, 1985. p. 108
31
White, Gordon. “Civil Society, Democratization and Development: Clearing the Analytical Ground”, in
Peter Burnell et al., “Civil Society in Democratization”, London: Frank Class, 2004.
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of the latter. By developing and maintaining a balanced opposition, civil society
creates and sustains new democratic standards that regulate state actions.

Civil society is increasingly viewed as an exclusive property of liberal democracy.
This implies that civil society not only promotes democratization, but that
democratization is a prerequisite for the development of civil society. But is this always
true? That is, can relatively independent social organizations flourish in the absence of a
pluralist culture? The answer is yes. The next chapter will look at the history of Deng’s
economic and political reforms and explain how civil society came about under an
authoritarian government, then overview the development path of civil society in postMao China.

21

Chapter 2: The Emergence of Civil Society in China

In the summer of 2007, during an interview with “Friends of Nature”, China’s
oldest environmental NGO headquartered in Beijing, I learned about the unusual history
of the organization. The founder of the NGO, Liang Congjie, is the grandson of Liang
Qichao – the famous reformist and thinker during late Qing Dynasty – and the son of
China’s well-known architects Liang Sicheng and Lin Huiyin. Back in 1993, Liang
Congjie took the initiative to establish the first environmental NGO officially registered
at the Ministry of Civil Affairs. As a member of the National Committee of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference, Liang had connections within the Party that
facilitated the registration and start-up processes. This shows that though the government
had tight control over civil society, voluntary societal organizations and networks such as
“Friends of Nature” were being formed spontaneously. For my parents’ generation, who
spent their teenage years in the Cultural Revolution fervor, the emergence of these
voluntary social organizations marked a dramatic departure from the previous totalitarian
state under Mao’s leadership. The chapter will first look at what happened in post-Mao
China that led to the emergence and development of civil society, then examine whether
the growth of civil society in China is a grassroots, bottom-up process, a state-led effort,
or a mix of the two.
The three decades since the end of the Cultural Revolution has seen three major
trends that I will discuss further: the introduction of a market economy, increasing
political participation and the emergence of civil society.

22

The finale of the Cultural Revolution marked an end to the two decades of domestic
social disorder. During mid-1978, a reflection of the previous political deviations of
Mao’s era triggered heated ideological debates within the party leaders. The main divide
was between Mao’s dogmatism and Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism that advocated “seek
truth from facts”. Eventually, pragmatism prevailed in the debate.
In December 1978, the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party
Congress was held in Beijing. The meeting re-affirmed the newly emerging liberal
ideology and shifted the focus of the political agenda from class struggle and the
construction of socialism to economic development and stability. After the death of Mao,
Deng Xiaoping quickly emerged as China’s paramount leader. The Third Plenum of the
Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Congress is widely regarded as a watershed in 20th
century Chinese politics because it marked the beginning of the new reform era and
paved the way for the initiation of economic and political reforms.
The most imperative task faced by Deng in late 1970’s was to re-legitimize the rule of
the Communist Party. He conceptualized two ways to achieve the goal – economic
development and political liberalization. I will briefly summarize the introduction of a
market economy through a series of economic reforms and political liberalization
achieved by political reforms. Then I will examine how the increased standard of living
and political participation gave rise to the emergence of civil society in China.

23

Building a Market Economy
The pre-1978 economic system in China was centrally planned and characterized
by massive distortions. Deng introduced economic reforms that unfolded from 1979 to
1994.
Central planning played a principal part and market a secondary part during the
first five years of economic reforms. It was a step forward from Mao’s anti-free market
ideology. Five major reforms took place during the period including agricultural reform,
economic opening, fiscal decentralization, state-owned enterprise reform, and township
and village enterprise reform32.
Agricultural reform introduced the household responsibility system that emerged
spontaneously in poor areas among peasants and became official in 1980. In 1982, the
party issued an official document entitled “National Village Policy Brief” to endorse
agricultural reforms. By the end of the year, 80 percent of households had adopted the
system nationwide. The reform created income incentives for peasants and consequently
resulted in increased productivity. The agricultural reform was particularly important
because it contributed to the successful village elections later on that led to grassroots
democratization.
In July 1979, the party and State Council passed the proposition to grant
preferential policies for foreign trade and to establish four special economic zones
(Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen) along the south coast as a major effort to open
up to foreign trade and investment. The four zones enjoyed lower tax rates and special
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institutional environment to attract foreign investment and facilitate trade. Southern
coastal provinces Guangdong and Fujian were the forefront of the opening-up policy: The
two provinces were allowed to adopt special policies and implement flexible measures, as
well as to retain all foreign exchange income after contributing 30 percent to the central
government. These areas pioneered the market liberalization process when the rest of
China was still dominated by central planning and public ownership.
Fiscal decentralization created multiple power centers at local levels. Local
governments had more incentives to run efficient fiscal budgets and improve economic
performance. Prior to the reforms, the fiscal system was centralized at the Planning
Commission in Beijing. All government revenue and expenditures had to go through the
central government who had the authority to determine local budgetary plans on an
annual basis. A major fiscal reform entitled Fenzao Chifan – “eating from separate
kitchens” – was carried out in 1980 to divide fiscal budgetary income between central
fixed revenue and local revenue. Fiscal decentralization laid ground for democratization
to occur at grassroots levels.
In July 1979, the central government issued five documents to promote stateowned enterprise (“SOE”) reform on an experimental basis. By 1980, about 60 percent of
the SOEs (in terms of output) accepted the new terms and gained limited but considerable
autonomy. These enterprises obtained rights to produce and sell products to the market
after fulfilling the plan quotas, and to promote middle-level management without the
central government approvals. Moreover, the SOEs were also allowed to retain profits but
required to use them in employee welfare, bonuses and product management.
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The last reform brought about Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) and
paved way for private business. TVEs are market-oriented public enterprises under the
purview of local governments based in townships and villages. They evolved from
commune- and brigade-run industries that had been set up to serve the rural areas during
the Great Leap Forward. In July 1979, the State Council issued new regulations that lifted
the restrictions for the TVEs to serve certain industries. TVEs consequently experienced
significant expansion in the 1980’s and 1990’s.
By 1984, the success of the first phase of reform proved extraordinary. In the
agricultural production sector, the per capita grain production increased by 25 percent
from 1978 to 1984, and the per capital rural income increased by more than 50 percent in
the six-year period.33 In October 1984 at the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Party Congress,
Beijing called for an overall reform of the planned economy to expand the reforms into
urban areas. The Party Congress meeting signified another shift of ideology from
“planning as the principal part and market as the supplementary part” to an overall
planned “commodity economy”, and hence heightened the role of market in the economic
reforms.
Major measures of the second wave of economic reforms included granting
enterprises more autonomy, embracing market mechanisms, and separating government
administration from enterprise management. Specifically, Zhao Ziyang, who became the
main party leader engineering the reforms backed by Deng Xiaoping, carried out the
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dual-track approach to market liberalization and SOE reform through contract
responsibility system (Qiye Chengbao Zeren Zhi).
The contract responsibility system increased enterprise autonomy of the SOEs.
Enterprises retained more profits and control rights to managers, and had new ways to
divide enterprise cash flows from the government cash flows. By the end of 1987, about
80 percent of large and medium-size SOEs had adopted the new system.
A major financial reform also took place during the period. Four specialized
banks were established in addition to the dominant central bank – the People’s Bank of
China (PBOC). The State Council transferred commercial operations to four specialized
banks from the PBOC: the Agricultural bank of China for the rural sector, the Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China for the industrial sector, the People’s Construction Bank
of China for long-term investment, and the Bank of China for foreign exchange
businesses. The four banks were allowed to compete for loans in each monopolized
markets, and enterprises were allowed to borrow from multiple banks. The financial
reform significantly facilitated the growth of enterprises by facilitating the capital flows.
The success of the four special economic zones and two provinces led the central
government to promote another fourteen coastal cities including Shanghai and Tianjin as
special economic zones. All the fourteen cities successfully obtained authority to accept
substantial foreign investments.
The Fourteenth Party Congress in October 1992 set the clear goal to construct a
“socialist free-market economy” with “Chinese characteristics” for the first time. Early
1990’s saw price reforms that narrowed the gap between the planned and market prices.
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An inflow of foreign direct investment contributed to the rapid growth of private
enterprises. By 1994, the Chinese economy had taken a huge step from a centralized to
market economy, but still carried some character of a planned economy. In the next stage
of economic development, Vice Premier Zhu Rongji centralized the operations of the
central bank and minimized local governments’ influence on monetary policies in 1994,
and the government started privatizing SOEs and laying off state workers on a large scale
in 1995. These successful efforts eventually established China as an emerging market
economy by 1998.

Increasing Political Participation and Contestation

Deng was by no means a democrat. He rejected the idea of democratizing China
at the very beginning because he did not see democracy as fit for China. For Deng,
democracy’s potential to create social disorder and anarchy would be destructive after
China suffered from the ten-year Cultural Revolution which virtually led to a civil war.
He considered democracy essentially a western political invention that would not work in
China given the challenges posed by the country’s vast territory, diversity of population
and average low levels of education. In his eyes, an authoritarian regime was a much
better option for its efficiency to implement reforms and yield immediate results.
Therefore, democratization was the last thing on his mind on the verge of economic
reforms.
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When Deng first came to power in 1978, the foremost task was to re-construct
national trust in the Chinese Communist Party and to legitimize its rule. In contrast to the
“revolutionary legitimacy” in Maoist era, Deng pursued a philosophy of “rational
legitimacy”34. His famous quote “No matter it is a white cat or a black cat, the cat that
catches the mice is the good cat” is a best demonstration of his pragmatism. Deng
believed that political reforms were indispensable because the totalitarian political
structure in 1978 would render economic reforms ineffective, as he said that “Without
political change, economic reform would be impossible to maintain and advance”35. In
order to ensure successful economic development, Deng carried out a series of political
reforms that decentralized state political power and created more political freedoms for
Chinese citizens, even though he did not mean to democratize.
Political liberalization in the Post-Mao era traces back to the Beijing Spring, a
democratic movement launched in November 1978 right after the Cultural Revolution
with the purpose of consolidating Deng’s power within the government. Following the
CCP’s promotion of “seeking truth from facts” policy, the intellectuals initiated open
criticism of the Communist regime and put up big-character posters (Da Zibao) on the
“Democracy Wall” on Xidan Street in Beijing. A democratic activist Wei Jingsheng
designed a poster entitled The Fifth Modernization, the first poster that advocated
individual liberties as an important measurement of development, in addition to the goals
of Deng’s reforms, namely “the four modernizations” in agriculture, industry, national
defense, and science of technology. Although the Beijing Spring movement was shut
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down within a year and Wei was sentenced to fifteen years of jail-time, the liberal ideas
lingered and inspired educated Chinese throughout the 1980’s.
The continuing institutionalization of the authoritarian rule of the CCP has
generated limited but observable and measurable momentum towards a more open
political system. It is yet questionable whether China is becoming more democratic or not,
but the institutional foundations for a genuine democracy have been constructed since the
late 1970’s. The limited extent of democratization induced by Deng’s reforms was
supported by the following three major institutional changes 36 : 1) experiments in
grassroots self-government, namely, the launch of village elections; 2) legal institutional
reform that improved the rule of law; 3) reform of representative organizations, chiefly
the National People’s Congress.

 Village and Local Elections
The village elections promoted by the Chinese government is one of the world’s
largest grassroots democratic education processes. Elections to the People’s Congress
have been held at the country and village levels since the early 1980’s. The official
launch of village elections was marked by the enactment of the Organic Law of Village
Committees (“OLVC”) in 1987 (amended in 1998). 37 The law guaranteed selfgovernance via self-management, self-education and self-service. The promotion of selfgovernment in rural areas led to a rapid growth of grassroots organizations in the
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countryside and competitive village committee elections. The term “grassroots
democracy” has since then been adopted to describe the political liberalization in rural
areas as a result of the grassroots self-governance experiments. Each village committee
consists of three to seven members, among them a village director and a deputy, who are
elected every three years according to the Organic Law. By the end of 1991, half of the
one million villages in China had selected their local self-governing committees through
elections38. By 1994, half of the Chinese villages had begun elections, and by 1997, 25 of
the 31 mainland provinces had adopted a local version of the law, and 80 percent of the
villages had begun elections39. In 1998, the amended Organic Law of Village Committees
(amended) promised democratic election, democratic decision making, democratic
management and democratic supervision. Therefore, it set the requirements for village
committees to implement democratic administration and subjected them to fiscal
accountability.
Village elections not only encouraged political participation but also initiated political
contestation. The competitiveness of village elections increased over the years. The
OLVC requires the candidates to be nominated by villagers – this version of election is
called haixuan. Before 1998, candidates for the chairman of village committees were
often appointed by the township government, although popular nomination, a mixture of
government appointment and popular nomination, and nomination by village
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representatives also existed 40 . However, more villagers increasingly demanded to
nominate their own candidates for village committees. Under the pressure of popular
demand, haixuan has become more popular since 1998, and more candidates have been
nominated to compete for the chairman position, which I will illustrate in more detail in
Chapter Three.

Moreover, an economics study shows that village elections have

substantially strengthened the accountability of the village governments but weakened
local fiscal sharing and the state’s authority in the grassroots society 41 . Moreover,
Kennedy, Rozelle, and Shi
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compared the elections with government-appointed

candidates and elections with villager-nominated candidates in Shaanxi Province, and
concluded that the latter produced village leaders that proved more accountable to
villagers in decision-making regarding land reallocations.
However, there has been much debate on the effectiveness of village elections that are
often said to be controlled by the CCP43. The amendment of 1998 provided guidelines for
democratic elections but failed to alter the way local power was exercised1. Assessment
of the village elections shows that election procedures have improved significantly via
substantial changes on steering committees, voter registration, candidate nomination ,
campaigning, secret balloting and proxy-voting. Yet the quality of grassroots democracy
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remains low, because the elected village committees are situated in a sociopolitical
environment that has changed little over the years44.
Growing political contestation is also demonstrated by the introduction of competitive
elections into the Communist Party in local elections during the early 90’s. Some party
candidates had to be eliminated in each election. For instance, the party primaries
eliminated 5 percent of the candidates who were conservatives as delegates to the
Thirteenth Party Congress in 198745. In 1993, officials backed by the Communist Party
Central Organization Department in Beijing lost to candidates nominated by provincial
people’s congress delegates, in the elections for governors in Zhejiang Province and
Guizhou Province46. The loss of the Beijing candidates showed the increased power of
local governments and the improved legitimacy of the elections. The losses of the
Communist Party candidates acted as a catalyst for Party reforms in 1995, which
amended the selection rules of the elective office candidates except for the leaders at the
very top. In the first set of elections following the reforms, more than 17,000 Communist
Party candidates lost to candidates nominated by congress delegates and individuals not
on the ballots.47 The 1995 reform was part of a broad effort to improve the caliber of
government officials at local congresses.
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 Legal Reforms
Legal reform was another component of the political reform that improved legal
protection of citizens’ basic rights and imposed limits on state power. Deng resuscitated
police departments and courts that had been damaged during the Cultural Revolution in
an effort to establish an institutional foundation of a market economy and constitutional
government. In 1979, a comprehensive criminal code and a code of criminal procedure
were adopted in which it was stated for the first time that people should not be prosecuted
for their reactionary ideas. The codes emphasized the due process of law including the
standard public trials and limited detention of suspects. The 1982 constitution re-stated
that “all citizens are equal by law”, which was first included in the 1954 constitution but
deleted later. Remarkably, the 1989 Administrative Procedure Law (revised in 1994)
gave the citizens the right to sue the government for the first time. “Counter-revolution”
was dismissed as a crime in 1996. It did not mean, however, that the party-state
relinquished its control over speech, associations and activities that could be considered
counter-revolutionary. Between 1979 and 1992, the National People’s Congress (“NPC”)
and China’s legislature together passed more than 600 laws with additional 2,300 laws
enacted by local people’s congresses48, which marked a huge and decisive step towards
stronger rule of law. The enforcement of contracts consequently improved. Responding
to the demands of a growing market economy, Chinese courts became heavily involved
in securing property rights and resolving contract disputes. The involvement enhanced
the institutional power of the courts and thus enabled them to counterweight against the
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CCP’s monopoly of political power. Since March 1993, under the leadership of Qiao Shi
who was the charimar of NPC’s Standing Committee from 1993-98, the CCP accelerated
the efforts towards a more institutionalized rule of law so as to support the rapid
economic development. The party emphasized the priority to protect property rights,
maintain open competition in the marketplace and strengthen the state’s capacity for
macroeconomic control.
However, although the legal reforms signified a big step forward from the
totalitarian system of Maoist era, rule of law still has a long way to go in today’s China.
Three years ago, I had a conversation with Professor Wang from Beijing Women’s Law
Center when she was visiting Colby’s campus. She used to be a judge, but continuous
government interference in the courts forced her to quit her job. This example shows that
the Chinese judiciaries are not independent from the state, which poses a serious
challenge for exercising rule of law. Hence, legal reforms have realized rule by law, but
not rule of law.

 Reform of the National People’s Congress and Party Administration

Until the 1990’s, NPC was completely subordinate to the CCP. However,
generational shifts and increased education levels of the NPC deputies improved the
institution in the 1990’s and allowed the NPC to become more independent of the partystate. Over the years, the local people’s congresses and the NPC gradually became a court
of appeal for Chinese citizens. The NPC received increasing number of letters from
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private individual citizens for assistance in various personal matters, and protected the
local people’s congresses from the pressure of local government officials. Therefore, the
NPC slowly began to assert its role as a representative of social interests, some of which
the government were reluctant to attend to. Notably, in October 1989, the Standing
Committee of the NPC for the first time rejected a law regarding urban neighborhood
committees after less than half of the members voted for it. In recent years, the number of
opposition and abstention votes increased at NPC meetings for the passage of laws and
elections of senior government and party officials. Although the NPC continues to rubber
stamp most of the party’s policies and recommendations, delegates have become
emboldened to abstain from or even oppose some proposals. In 1992, for example, when
the NPC passed the “Resolution on the Construction of the Three Gorges Project on the
Yangtze River" with 1,767 delegates voting in favor, a high number of 644 delegates
abstained and 177 opposed the project. The institutional improvements of the NPC and
local people’s congresses have therefore established a more independent and effective
legislative body that invites increasing political contestation.
When starting the party structure reforms, Deng had three main goals in mind:
separating the party and the government, minimizing bureaucratic inefficiency and rentseeking behavior, and expanding the power of the local governments. To achieve the
goals, Deng thought of a way to replace old party comrades with younger collegeeducated technocrats and professionals in the government. He created institutions such as
the Central Advisory Commission (“CAC”) as a transition agency to invite 131 old party
comrades to step down. The new government officials stressed technical and
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administrative feasibility in policy-making, and represented Deng’s advocacy of
“pragmatism”. In addition, for more effective and penetrating governance, Deng installed
a civil service system and the Ministry of Personnel in 1988. All these efforts
institutionalized and regulated the party administrative system.
Deng’s political reform was designed to legitimate party rule and, more importantly,
to facilitate economic reforms on a practical basis. What Deng wanted was not a change
of the system, but a change within the system. He viewed democracy as a means to
modernization rather than a political goal worth pursuing at that point in history.
Moreover, he believed that CCP was the only proper vehicle to achieve modernization.
However, although Deng did not endorse democracy, his call for political reforms raised
hopes for democratization among the general population. The successful and accelerating
economic reforms raised the standard of living and education level of the Chinese
population who increasingly demanded political freedoms. The increased trade and
communication with foreign countries also introduced liberal ideas to China. The above
historical account of the economic and political reform has briefly explained the
socioeconomic conditions that gave rise to the emergence of civil society in mid-1980’s.
The thesis will focus on the civil society development beginning from this time period
when the democratic ideals started burgeoning and analyze the unique case of civil
society development in a fast growing market economy governed by the Communist
Party.
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An Emerging Civil Society
 China under Chairman Mao
The post-Mao era has to be viewed in perspective with the Maoist era in order to
generate a comprehensive understanding on the emergence of civil society in China. I
will briefly describe the political and social conditions prior to 1978. From 1949 to 1978,
China was characterized as a “total society” (“a world of universal anomie populated by
the hybridised subjects of mutual recognition” 49 ) in which the government controlled
nearly all the resources. The market sector and the private sector were both contained
within the realm of the state50 . The CCP asserted control over the society by strictly
restricting the public space to organize and associate.
During the Maoist era the CCP relied primarily on revolution itself as a ground for
political legitimation. The party used Mao’s personality cult as a basis of charismatic
legitimacy and provided Marxist ideology as original justification. After a brief “Gold
Age” of social stability and economic development in the immediate years after the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the CCP led the Chinese people
through a series of disastrous movements that “ripped apart the ruling elite, caused social
dislocation and famine on a massive scale, and culminated in the Cultural Revolution”51.
Mao Zedong was promoted as the supreme leader in China’s revolution in pursuit of a
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philosophy of perpetual revolution. At that time, it didn’t seem to have alarmed the senior
party leaders that the build-up of a Mao cult “negated the stress on collective leadership
and loyalty to the CCP as an organization”52. The two decades from late 1950’s to late
1970’s consequently saw one political campaign after another. In 1951, CCP launched
the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Campaign, Three Anti Five Anti Campaign
and Thought Reform of Intellectuals Campaign that targeted at installing a social order
that facilitated all-encompassing party control. The Socialist Transformation of Industry
and Commerce Campaign in 1955 aimed at transforming and incorporating urban
capitalists into state enterprises to strengthen a planned economy. Faced with criticism of
the party, Mao started the Anti-rightist Campaign against critics of the party in 1957,
followed by “Great Leap Forward” launched in 1958 in an effort to mobilize Chinese
manpower for economic development, which had destructive impact on agricultural
production. The Cultural Revolution started in 1966 and lasted until 1976. The ten years
of Cultural Revolution ate away the social capital in China because CCP encouraged
citizens to report and attack “revisionists” and “capitalist roaders” that led to a massive
degree of distrust among the population.

 Emerging Civil Society in Post-Mao Era
The 1978 economic reforms marked a turning point in history after which the
Chinese social structure experienced a complete make-over. The series of economic
reforms liberalized the market and further led to political reforms. Minxin Pei points out

52

Saich, p. 27.

39

that “rapid economic development has brought enormous changes to Chinese society and
created a more hospitable environment for individuals to assert and protect their rights”.53
Elizabeth Perry agrees with Pei’s point and contends that “advanced economic
development may indeed demand new political arrangements that afford far greater
autonomy to legal institutions and civil society”54.
The initial form of the emerging civil society was non-political. After the
government put an end to totalitarian control over the societal affairs in the late 1970’s,
the urban population had more opportunities to organize their social life and express
views freely. The political fervor of the Cultural Revolution induced the people to shy
away from political activities at the beginning of the civil society revival. Grassroots
activities appeared including pet raising organizations, martial arts clubs, and so forth55.
During the 80’s, the official government-led open condemnation of the excesses of Maoera politics invited the Chinese citizens to engage in political advocacy groups. At the
same time, Deng’s promotion of open discussion on reform-era politics made it difficult
for the local party officials to restrict and control the formation of popular attitudes. The
authorities provided greater latitude for social association and public expression,
therefore enabling people to organize and formulate more and more social groups at the
local level. The growing conflict within the political elite also contributed to the
emergence of a civil society. The criticism and debate about the political system at the
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top had a trickle-down effect to society as citizens found that they were able to find
reformists at the top to listen to their political views and provide protection if needed.
Furthermore, some articles appeared in the late 1980’s stressing the need to encourage the
development of civil society and discussing the virtues of interest groups. One article
concluded, “We must recognize the existence of different interest groups which conflict
and converge, and realize that in the end that very multitude of interests constitutes the
general social interest” 56 . In summary, reform-induced and state-led liberalization
introduced a new political atmosphere in both economic and social spheres in the 80’s,
which contributed to the emergence a burgeoning civil society.
However, civil society came into being not only as a result of the new political
environment, but also due to growing discontent with the Chinese government among the
society. Although Deng’s economic and political reforms were designed to legitimize the
rule of the Communist Party, they in fact brought about dissatisfaction and hostility
towards the party that resulted in social unrest conducive to democratization. The
negative effects of the economic reforms started kicking in by the late 80’s.
Unsurprisingly, the transitioning economy widened the income gap between rich and
poor, caused inflation and helped corruption. Many within the party took advantage of
the loopholes of the under-developed markets and capitalized on their party connections,
and this infuriated lots of Chinese citizens. Owing to high inflation, many urban residents
experienced declining real income.
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According to the United Nations World Income Inequality Database (WIID),
historical data on China’ss Gini Coefficient (A commonly used economic metric for
income inequality with values from 0 to 1: 1 being perfect inequality and 0 being perfect
perf
equality) shows that inequality declined since the 1950s and reached the lowest level by
late 1970’s,
s, however increased steadily throughout the 1980
1980’ss and 1990’s,
1990 as shown
below57 in Figure 1 “Gini
Gini coefficient (mean)
(mean)”:

Figure 11: Gini Coefficient (1987 – 2002)

In addition to growing income inequality, inflation, unemployment and corruption
among party officials gave rise to increasing discontent in the society.. Students and
intellectuals were among those most affected because of the state
state’ss low budget for
education and limited job opportunities in the more prosperous market sector of the
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economy. The social unrest was accompanied by increasing democratic awareness within
the society. The previous Beijing Spring democratic movement along with an inflow of
liberal ideas from the western media inspired and encouraged Chinese citizens to take the
initiative to express their opinions and represent their interests. Deng’s reforms also
raised people’s hopes and expectations for democratization. Decentralization gave more
autonomy to local governments, firms and individuals. Under such economic and
political circumstances, people started organizing groups and associations to advocate
and represent their interests, and a civil society therefore started flourishing from below.
In September 1988, Deng pushed for price and wage reforms in an attempt to
fight inflation and unemployment. However, people’s fear of an unpredictable market led
to hoarding and higher inflation 58 . Numerous students and intellectuals organized
autonomous groups in response to social unrest and political dispute. College students
organized public demonstrations in several cities for democracy, demanding more rights,
liberties and welfare. They protested at Tiananmen Square the following June and
received brutal government suppression at the so-called “1989 Chinese Democracy
Movement”. Thomas Gold sees the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests as a demonstration
of the resurgence of Chinese civil society throughout the country that even “tanks and
guns cannot prevent”. 59 Similarly, McCormick et al. argues that “the 1989 Chinese
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Democracy Movement is best understood as the expression of a fundamental conflict
between a state with totalitarian intentions and an emerging civil society”60.
The development of civil society in China follows a different model. The reason
for it can be best understood using a “three-sector” model approach. Prior to reforms, the
Chinese state contained both the market sector and the third sector (private sector). With
economic and political liberalization, the state retreated gradually but simultaneously
from the market sector and the third sector, which created new social space for
articulation of interests in the society. However, since the growth of the market sector and
the third sector was initiated by the government, the two sectors developed high reliance
on state power with limited independence. In most western societies, however, society,
which includes the market sector and the third sector, is usually not fully contained
within the state realm before market liberalization. Hence, the market sector formulates
and separates from the society rather than from the state realm as in the case of China. In
other words, the “three-sector” social structure in most western societies came into being
in two steps instead of one step. Consequently, civil society organizations in China carry
distinctive “political” and “commercial” features
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. The controlled simultaneous

detachment of the sectors also complicated the boundaries between the state and the third
sector as well as between the market and the third sector. Frolic’s “state-led civil society”
theory echoes with the above argument.
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The overlapping of state and third sector naturally makes the authoritarian
embrace of civil society purposeful. On one hand, the introduction of a market economy
and power decentralization have created needs for social organizations to undertake
previous state functions. On the other hand, the internationalization of human rights
discourse since the 1980’s urged the Chinese government to alter the terms through
which it enunciated its legitimacy.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, civil society is linked more to modernization than to
democratization. The same is true for civil society development in authoritarian Russia.
Both regimes rely on social organizations in providing efficiencies that government
bureaucracies cannot. In China and Russia, as market reforms eliminated many iron-bowl
jobs at state-owned enterprises offering solid healthcare, the state looked to autonomous
social organizations to provide health services and support pensioners as well as the
disabled. Moreover, the state finds it easier to let the social organizations regulate and
monitor their members. Through the control of registered social organizations via party
organs, the state achieves effective supervision over the entire society. In South Korea,
for example, the government forced all businesses to join associations under Park ChungHee’s rule in the 1960s, so that the government could easily regulate business activities
by controlling the associations through appropriate ministries62. In addition, thanks to the
expansive outreach into the society, the NGOs can often disseminate information faster
than government bureaucracies. The state can therefore take advantage of the
“transmission belt” functionality of civil society organizations. At the same time, both
62
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Russian and Chinese regimes use social organizations to monitor local government
officials to reduce corruption and ensure policy implementation at multi-levels. In this
way, civil society strengthens the state, which is in agreement with Vivienne Shue’s
argument that civil society and state do not necessarily engage in a zero-sum game.
Michael Frolic points out that the civil society in China is state-led. Subject to
restrictive registration regulations, registered social organizations are much less
independent than their Western NGO counterparts. National regulations require that civil
society organizations have a government-approved “sponsor organization” to register at
the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Only designated party and government bureaus and mass
organizations may sponsor non-governmental organizations63. Procedurally, the sponsor
organizations need to submit applications to the Ministry of Civil Affairs and only those
social organizations with at least 50 members and ca. $4000 in capital funds can meet the
Ministry’s requirements, which prevents small grassroots organizations from establishing
themselves legally. Once the Ministry approves the social organization, the sponsor
organization and Ministry of Civil Affairs will supervise the organization through a dual
administrative system that severely limits the autonomy of registered social organizations.
Such a registration scheme takes virtually all the registered social organizations under
control of the party umbrella. For this reason, these registered NGOs are given a new
name “GONGOs” – government-organized non-governmental organizations.
Nevertheless, recent years have seen a growing social force from below in spite of
the state’s control over social organizations. Civil society is no longer just a tool for the
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government to improve its governance. Despite the state’s ability to maintain control of
certain organizations, decentralization of state power makes it increasingly unlikely that
this ability is all-encompassing. Hence, Tony Saich argues that “There is a significant gap
between the rhetoric and practice and between the expressed intent of the party-state
authorities, a system that is itself deeply conflicted, and what can actually be enforced for
any significant period throughout the entire country.”64
Mary E. Gallagher categorizes the social organizations in China into three kinds:
organizations devolved from the socialist state (previously designated as bureaus or
government departments or groups from one of the mass organizations); organizations
created by the state (GONGO); and organizations set up through the initiative of private
individuals or groups. Groups devolved from or created by the party-state are top-down
social organizations; groups initiated within society are from the bottom up.65 Along the
same line, Frolic argues that there are “two types of emerging civil society” in China66.
Michael Frolic refers GONGOs as one type and the other type as mostly unregistered
grassroots organizations that navigate their ways out of the government control. Wan
Yanhai’s Aizhixing Institute falls into this category. Unofficial reports suggest that the
number of non-governmental organizations actually exceed one million in 2006 67 and
most of them are not registered to be official. Between 1990 and 1993, the number of
social organizations registered at the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs grew fifteen-fold
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from 10,855 to 167,50668. The numbers only entail limited truth in regard to civil society
development as they exclude a large group of active civil society organizations working
unofficially. The official statistics, therefore, largely underestimate the actual scale of
civil society activity.
Not only have social organizations been increasing in numbers, but they also have
begun to play a more important role in policy reform and implementation. In 2005, when
the government planned to build the Nu River dams, Chinese environment groups formed
a coalition “urging the government to hold open hearings and make public a secret report
on the Nu dams before making a final decision”69. In 2006, following NGO resistance,
the government of Ganzi Prefecture in Sichuan Province canceled a local hydroelectric
project, signaling the first success by Chinese NGOs to pressure the government on
environmental grounds70. Some NGOs might have had a direct impact on enhancing the
competitiveness of village elections. For example, “Rural Women Knowing All”, an
NGO actively involved in promoting education and microcredit programs for women in
rural areas, has effectively increased literacy and self-awareness among women living in
the countryside, and enabled them to earn a living by providing microfinance loans.
Moreover, some NGOs have strong connections with the foreign counterparts and
together formulate a considerable social force from below against the pressure from the
Chinese government. Wan Yanhai’s Aizhixing Institute has had massive international
support and national impact on the HIV/AIDS community. Groups pushing for greater
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awareness of HIV/AIDS have been critical in exposing the Henan Province blood scandal,
in which thousands of peasants were infected when they sold their blood.
I have shown in this chapter that economic and political reforms in the Post-Mao
era introduced a market economy and encouraged political participation, which led to
some degree of democratization. At the same time, the reforms have generated
fundamental changes in the society that gave rise to an emerging civil society. Since the
90’s, social organizations are no longer content with working with the state to provide
efficiencies as GONGOs and have become increasingly active and influential. In turn, by
promoting political participation and contestation, civil society organizations have
induced democratic openings as the above examples demonstrate. The next chapter will
further look into the relationship between civil society activity and democratization.
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Chapter 3: The Statistical Study

In the previous chapters, I have discussed the emergence of civil society and
democratization in post-Mao China as a result of economic and political reforms. I have
also shown that civil society development has had an impact on democratization and vice
versa. This chapter will probe into the potential correlation between the proliferation of
social organizations (civil society development) and democratization at micro- and
macro-level. Specifically, in the first section of this chapter, I will use the
competitiveness of village elections as a proxy for micro-level democratization in a
period of fifteen years. The competitiveness of village elections will be calculated based
on the local elections data available in an economics study. In the second section, I will
discuss the explanatory variables selected to explain the variance in democratization,
including the variable of civil society activity. The data is acquired from the Ministry of
Civil Affairs. Then I will conduct correlation analysis between civil society activity and
micro-level democratization. The last section of the chapter introduces international
indices as rough measures for macro-level democratization and discusses the correlation
between civil society activity and macro-level democratization.
If doing a statistical study on politics is difficult, then doing one on Chinese
democratization is ambitious. For one thing, the scale of democratization is small and
hard to measure. For another, getting relevant data is not easy owing to limited
government transparency. My failure to get the data on NPC election votes proves that
China remains a strong authoritarian regime and still far from being democratic. Recent
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voting behavior at NPC elections shows an increasing number of opposition and
abstention votes than 80s. For instance, in the 1998 Ninth NPC Elections, the candidate
for the NPC chairman position, Li Peng, received 200 opposition votes and 126
abstention votes. However, in the past, opposition and abstention votes were always
fewer than one hundred. Inspired by the trend, I spent two months in December and
January making numerous efforts trying to get the data on NPC votes in the past two
decades. I contacted people working at the National People’s Congress and Local
People’s Congress, university professors with expertise on NPCs and many research
institutions. Unfortunately, I was either told that such a record of past NPC votes was
unheard of, or that the government did not keep a record and would not publicly disclose
even if it did. I was appalled that Chinese citizens could not find out how many elected
representatives voted for or against the president, CMC chairman and vice president at
NPC elections, which are broadcasted on national television in recent years. I had to
reluctantly give up using NPC votes as a measure for macro-level democratization and
use international democracy indices instead, which I will introduce in later sections of the
chapter.

Measuring Micro-level Democratization

The economics paper conducted by Shuna Wang and Yang Yao on village
elections collected survey data from 48 villages in eight provinces over 17 years (1986 –
2002). The provinces are Guangdong (seven villages), Hunan (seven villages), Zhejiang
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(nine villages), Henan (three villages), Sichuan (seven villages), Gansu (five villages),
Shanxi (seven villages) and Jilin (three villages), with a geographical spread from the
south part (Guangdong, Hunan, Zhejiang and Sichuan) of China to the north (Henan,
Gansu, Shanxi and Jilin). The map below shows the location of these provinces in China
for reference.

The sample was drawn from the National Fixed-point Survey (“NFS”) under the
administration of the Research Center of Rural Economy, Ministry of Agriculture. The
NFS started in 1986 and covers more than 300 villages including 24,000 households in
all provinces in the mainland of China. Hence, the sample should sufficiently represent
village elections throughout the country for the study purpose.
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The
he NFS data provide information about village elections for the period 1986 –
2002 as shown below in Figure 2 “Procedures
Procedures used to nominate candidates for the VC
chairman”.. The survey recorded four types of procedures: government appointment,
nomination by village representatives, popular nomination ((haixuan)) and government
appointment plus popular nomination ((or “mixed nomination”).
). Figure 2 presents the
distribution of the four nomination procedures by year. I use the share of “Government
“
appointments” overr the entire period as a proxy for the variable “democratization
democratization”, or
more precisely, “anti-democratization
democratization”.. The assumption is that a higher percentage of
government-appointed
appointed candidates in village elections indicates a lower level of
democratization.

Figure 2:: Procedures Used to Nominate Candidates for the VC Chairman
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Table 1: Competitiveness of Village Elections
Year of Election

Share of Government
Appointed Candidates (%)

1987

33.33

1988

25

1989

25

1990

15.38

1991

25

1992

30.77

1993

11.76

1994

20

1995

18.18

1996

11.11

1997

37.5

1998

0

1999

0

2000

0

2001

0

2002

3.33
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Measuring
suring Civil Society Development

For the statistical study, I will use the official statistics on registered social
organizations at the Ministry of Civil Affairs, available for the time period of 1988 –
2008. The assumption is that increasing/decreasing number of registered social
organizations represents higher/lower civil society activity. Figure 3 below “Number of
Social Organizations” illustrates an overall upward trend of registered social
organizationss with two steep growth periods in 1990
1990-1992 and 2000-2002.

Figure 33: Number of Social Organizations

However, the proxy for civil society development is a useful indicator but not a
perfect measure because it is far from being comprehensive. Ideally, the variable should
have the total number of grassroots organizations including both types of social
organizations (NGOs and GONGOs). As I discussed in the previous chapter, the number
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of registered social organizations at the Ministry of Civil Affairs underestimates the
actual scale of civil society activity in China. Many Chinese NGO activists that I spoke
with in the summer of 2007 expressed the difficulty to register with the Ministry owing to
restrictive procedures. Many NGOs working on issues that were considered
“controversial” by the Chinese government had to register as private enterprises or to find
their own ways without any registration.
I have made efforts to get a more comprehensive measure that is less biased than
the one provided above by the government. Unfortunately, there are no available statistics
on the unregistered grassroots organizations, which also shows the opacity of grassroots
activism in today’s China.
Besides the variable of civil society activity, other variables are also introduced as
possible explanations for the variance in micro-level and macro-level democratization.
These include macroeconomic indicators: GDP per capita, urban population (percentage
of the entire population), and education (school-age children enrollment rate). The
common assumption is that economic development is conducive to democratization.
Additionally, a time variable is included to examine the variation of each variable with
time.
The seven variables “GOVT_APPT”, “POP_NOMINATION”, “SOCIAL_ORG”,
“GDP_CAPITA”, “TIME”, “URBAN”, “EDU” all have annual data points for the time
period of 1988 – 2002. The descriptions for each variable and the data are as follows:
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 GOVT_APPT: Percentage of government appointed candidates among all
candidates in village elections during the time period of 1988 – 200271.
 POP_NOMINATION: Percentage of candidates elected by popular nomination
among all candidates in village elections during the time period of 1988 – 200272.
 SOCIAL_ORG: Number of registered social organizations at the Ministry of
Civil Affairs. Social organizations include three categories: social groups, private
non-enterprises, and foundations73.
 GDP_CAPITA: National GDP per capita (purchasing power parity)74.
 EDU: School-age children enrollment rate as an indicator of the education level75.
 URBAN: Percentage of urban population in the total population76.
 TIME: Time series by year.
Table 2 below provides statistics for each variable for the time period of 1988 – 2002,
which I will use in the correlation analysis that follows.
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Table 2: Description of Explanatory Variables
GOVT_ APPT

POP_NOMINATION

SOCIAL_ORG

GDP_

(%)

(%)

(*100)

CAPITA

1988

25.00

25

44.46

1048.3

1989

25.00

0

45.44

1990

15.38

0

1991

25.00

1992

TIME

URBAN

EDU

(%)

(%)

1988

25.64

97.2

1074.7

1989

26.52

97.4

108.55

1099.3

1990

27.4

97.8

25

828.14

1184.2

1991

28.2

97.8

30.77

0

1545.02

1335.9

1992

29

97.2

1993

11.76

0

1675.06

1505.5

1993

29.8

97.7

1994

20.00

40

1740.6

1683.6

1994

30.6

98.4

1995

18.18

0

1805.83

1846.9

1995

31.4

98.5

1996

11.11

5.56

1848.21

2010.4

1996

32.28

98.8

1997

37.50

25

1813.18

2175.0

1997

33.16

98.9

1998

0.00

7.14

1656

2322.2

1998

34.04

98.9

1999

0.00

12.5

1426.65

2475.2

1999

34.92

99.1

2000

0.00

75

1533.22

2664.2

2000

35.8

99.1

2001

0.00

30.77

2109.39

2864.5

2001

36.72

99.1

2002

3.33

40

2445.09

3104.2

2002

37.64

98.6

As shown above, the dataset size is unfortunately small, containing only fifteen
data points. Therefore, the thesis is unable to use an OLS regression to analyze the data
and will instead use correlation method to study the association between civil society
activity and democratization. Correlations measure the strength and direction of the linear
relationship between two variables. In a regression analysis, the research focus is on the
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causal relationship; i.e., a dependent variable is predicted and the other independent
variables are the predictors. But in a correlation study, the research interest is not on
causal relations; that is, no variable serves as a predictor. Thus a correlation cannot tell us
anything about causation. However, the correlation study is still of strong interest as it
entails whether the variation in civil society activity happens simultaneously with the
changes in the degree of democratization both at the grassroots level (micro-level) and
national level (macro-level).
The calculation of the correlation coefficient is accomplished by STATA software.
The value of the correlation coefficient ranges from -1 to +1, with -1 indicating perfect
negative correlation and +1 perfect positive correlation, while 0 shows no correlation at
all. The sign of the correlation coefficient (+, -) defines the direction of the relationship,
either positive or negative. A positive correlation coefficient means that as the value of
one variable increases, the value of the other variable increases; as one decreases the
other decreases. A negative correlation coefficient indicates that as one variable increases,
the other decreases, and vice-versa. The two important factors in a correlation
relationship are strength and significance. The absolute value of the correlation
coefficient measures the strength of the correlation, whereas the probability/significance
level suggests the significance of it. The significance of the relationship shows how
unlikely the calculated correlation coefficient will occur if no correlation exists in the
variables. Therefore, the larger the correlation coefficient is, the stronger the relationship;
the smaller the probability level is, the more significant the relationship.
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Based on previous analysis, it is assumed that GOVT_APPT would negatively
correlate with the other six variables since it signifies the degree of “antidemocratization”. POP_NOMINATION is a positive indicator of democratization, and
the growth of SOCIAL_ORG, GDP_CAPITA, URBAN and EDU are all assumed to
have a positive impact on democratization. In addition, from Figure 2, it is obvious that
GOVT_APPT has declined over the years and therefore negatively correlated with TIME.
The output correlation matrice of the seven variables from STATA is shown as below in
Table 3 and Table 4:
Table 3: Correlation Output (Micro-level Democratization, Significance Level 5%)

GOVT_A~T POP_NO~N SOCIAL~G GDP_CA~A
GOVT_APPT
POP_NOMINA~N
SOCIAL_ORG
GDP_CAPITA
TIME
URBAN
EDU

1.0000
-0.2875
-0.3828
-0.6883*
-0.6806*
-0.6848*
-0.6173*

1.0000
0.2683
0.5177*
0.4855
0.4904
0.4331

1.0000
0.7856*
0.8285*
0.8215*
0.6678*

1.0000
0.9910*
0.9923*
0.8637*

TIME

1.0000
0.9997*
0.8869*

URBAN

1.0000
0.8811*

EDU

1.0000

Table 4: Correlation Output (Micro-level Democratization, Significance Level 16%)

GOVT_A~T POP_NO~N SOCIAL~G GDP_CA~A
GOVT_APPT
POP_NOMINA~N
SOCIAL_ORG
GDP_CAPITA
TIME
URBAN
EDU

1.0000
-0.2875
-0.3828*
-0.6883*
-0.6806*
-0.6848*
-0.6173*

1.0000
0.2683
0.5177*
0.4855*
0.4904*
0.4331*

1.0000
0.7856*
0.8285*
0.8215*
0.6678*

1.0000
0.9910*
0.9923*
0.8637*

TIME

1.0000
0.9997*
0.8869*

URBAN

1.0000
0.8811*

EDU

1.0000
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In Table 3, the correlation command yields all pairwise correlation coefficients
between the variables and stars the correlation coefficients significant at the 5% level77.
We can see that at this significance level, the correlation coefficients for GOVT_APPT
and

POP_NOMINATION

(not

significant),

SOCIAL_ORG

(not

significant),

GDP_CAPITA (significant), TIME (significant), URBAN (significant) and EDU
(significant) are all negative. In other words, the percentage of government appointed
candidates negatively correlates with the percentage of popular nominated candidates, the
number of social organizations, GDP per capita, time, percentage of urban population,
and education level. This result is in accord with my previous assumptions.
The absolute value of the SOCIAL_ORG correlation coefficient is significantly
lower than that of other variables: 0.3828 (Social organizations) compared to 0.6883
(GDP per capita), 0.6806 (Time), 0.6848 (Urban population) and 0.6173 (Education).
Therefore, though the results indicate that increasing civil society activity is associated
with increasing democratization at local level, the strength of the correlation between the
two is weak. In addition, the correlation coefficient for SOCIAL_ORG is not significant
at 5% level. That is, there is less than 95% probability that the coefficient will not be zero.
In Table 4, further analysis on the correlation significance shows that the optimal
probability

level

on

the

correlation

coefficient

between

GOVT_APPT

and

SOCIAL_ORG is 16%. Hence, there is a maximum 84% probability that SOCIAL_ORG
77

The level of significance indicates the probability of observing an estimated t-value greater than the
critical t-value if the null hypothesis were correct. The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation at all –
the coefficient is zero. Therefore, a 5% level of significance (95% level of confidence, the most commonly
chosen level of significance), indicates that there is 95% probability that the null hypothesis will be rejected.
In other words, the correlation coefficient will not be zero but the calculated value as shown in the matrix.
The 5% level of significance is the most commonly chosen confidence level for correlation study.
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is negatively correlated with GOVT_APPT at 0.3828. The probability level of 16% is a
threshold – a higher probability level than 16% will always yield a significant coefficient
and

a

lower

one

will

render

the

correlation

insignificant.

Furthermore,

POP_NOMINATION positively correlates with SOCIAL_ORG, GDP_CAPITA, TIME,
URBAN and EDU at 16% probability level as shown in Table 4. Since GOVT_APPT is
the proxy for “anti-democratization” and POP_NOMINATION for “democratization”,
the negative correlation coefficients and positive correlation coefficients, respectively,
offer a very tentative conclusion that the growth of social organizations is positively
associated with the competitiveness of village elections.
The tentative nature of this conclusion is due to the small correlation coefficient
(0.3828) that shows a weak correlation and the low significance level (0.16) that suggests
a possible insignificant result. Nevertheless, to a certain degree the results demonstrate
that the increasing number of social organizations has a positive correlation with the
percentage of popular nomination and a negative correlation with the percentage of
government nomination. It is safe to conclude, then, that despite the relatively weak
correlation, the statistical results correspond with the initial assumption that increasing
civil society activity has a positive correlation with grassroots democratization.
This preliminary conclusion challenges Michael Frolic’s claim in his book chapter
entitled “State-Led Civil Society” that civil society encourages democratic governance
only in “politically developed” Western systems. In authoritarian regimes, however, civil
society simply serves for effective government78. Frolic argues that the civil society in
78
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China is entirely “state-led”, created from the top down as an adjunct to state power and
denies a spontaneous social force emerging from below. He contends that Chinese civil
society is a collection of hundreds of thousands of social organizations and quasiadministrative units created by the state to “help it manage a complex and rapidly
expanding economy and changing society” 79 . The correlation results show that civil
society activity is not completely uncorrelated with democratization at the grassroots
level. If civil society were entirely created by the state, then its growth should not have
had any correlation with the competitiveness of village elections, since the peasants
demanded the village elections to be more competitive. Neither the number of social
organizations nor the competitiveness of village elections is a direct result of state efforts,
so the evidence proves Frolic’s argument to be weak and debatable.
However, correlation must be differentiated from causation. The results
demonstrate positive correlation between civil society activity and democratization,
which can be interpreted as that the proliferation of civil society in China happened
simultaneously with the growth of grassroots democratization. As the correlation
coefficients suggest, SOCIAL_ORG has high 0.8285 correlation with TIME and
GOVT_APPT has a -0.6806 correlation with TIME. In other words, over time, social
organizations have steadily increased and government nomination in village elections has
declined. It suggests a possibility that the growth of civil society and of micro-level
democratization have taken place simultaneously without interaction with each other.
However, the correlation between SOCIAL_ORG and GOVT_APPT, albeit weak, might

79

Frolic. p. 48.

63

imply that civil society development has encouraged the grassroots democratization and
civic engagement, so that the percentage of government appointed officials decreased
over the years under the pressure of popular opposition. Unfortunately, given the small
dataset, it is impossible to draw further conclusions by carrying out causation analysis.
Additionally, the correlation coefficients of government nomination with
macroeconomic factors (all significant at 5% level) indicate an unambiguously strong
correlation between economic development and democratization, thereby affirming the
main argument of modernization theory that an increasing standard of living facilitates
democratization. In particular, the higher levels of education and urbanization have
positive correlations with the competitiveness of village elections.
The competitiveness of village elections is a micro measure of democratization
that is restricted to the local level. The distribution of nomination methods for village
committee candidates reflects the quality of democratic election implementation in rural
areas and thus the development of grassroots democratization. However, democratization
should extend beyond the grassroots level. One would expect local democratization to
exert pressure on political elites at the top. That is, local officials in pursuit of local
development goals may challenge party-state policies and elite practices, both of which
influence the extent of democratization at the national level. Therefore, I will use a macro
measure of democratization in addition to the micro measure to examine the extent of the
emerging democratization.
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Measuring Macro-level Democratization

International indices are the only available measure for democratization on the
national level for China. The most relevant indices are these: Freedom of the Press Index,
World Bank “Voice and Accountability” and “Rule of Law” Indices, and CIRI Human
Rights Index. But of these four, only the Freedom of the Press and the Human Rights
Index record more than ten annual data points. As a result, I have opted to use these two
indices as indicators for democratization on the macro level to examine whether the
growth of civil society has had an impact on democratization beyond the grassroots.
However, these measures are far from perfect. The competitiveness of village elections,
though microscopic, captures the direct component of democracy – free and fair elections.
In contrast, the freedom of the press index and human rights index are only indicators that
correlate with the level of democratization based on the prevailing political rhetoric that
democracy protects civil liberties and guarantees rule of law and therefore allows for
more freedom of the press and reduces human rights violations.
Shown below is a detailed description of the CIRI Human Rights Index and the
Freedom of Press Index, which is acquired from http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ and
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=274.
 CIRI Human Rights Index
The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset contains standards-based
quantitative information on government respect for 15 internationally recognized human

65

rights for 195 countries annually from 1981 to 200780.The dataset contains measures of
government human rights practices including the following three components:

[PHYSINT] Physical Integrity Rights Index
This is an additive index constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political
Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for
these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights). Details on its
construction and use can be found in: David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards. 1999.
"Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical
Integrity Rights." International Studies Quarterly, Vol 43.2: 407-18.

[DISAP] Disappearance
Disappearances are cases in which people have disappeared, political motivation appears
likely, and the victims have not been found. Knowledge of the whereabouts of the
disappeared is, by definition, not public knowledge. However, while there is typically no
way of knowing where victims are, it is typically known by whom they were taken and
under what circumstances. A score of 0 indicates that disappearances have occurred
frequently in a given year; a score of 1 indicates that disappearances occasionally
occurred; and a score of 2 indicates that disappearances did not occur in a given year.

[KILL] Extrajudicial Killing
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Extrajudicial killings are killings by government officials without due process of law.
They include murders by private groups if instigated by government. These killings may
result from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by the police, security
forces, or other agents of the state whether against criminal suspects, detainees, prisoners,
or others. A score of 0 indicates that extrajudicial killings were practiced frequently in a
given year; a score of 1 indicates that extrajudicial killings were practiced occasionally;
and a score of 2 indicates that such killings did not occur in a given year.

The CIRI Human Rights Index adds the ratings for the three categories above and
formulate one score through the time period of 1981 – 2007. A higher score indicates
more human rights violations recorded and correlates with a lower level of
democratization. The output correlation matrix is as follows in Table 4 and 5. The
pairwise correlation method eliminates missing data points in pairs and reduces the
dataset size to 20 since the statistic for SOC_ORG_ALL is available only from 1988.
Table 5: Correlation Output (Macro-level Democratization 1, Significance Level 5%)
HUMAN_~L SOC_OR~L GDPPC_~L URBAN_~L
HUMAN_RIGH~L
SOC_ORG_ALL
GDPPC_ALL
URBAN_POP_~L
EDU_ALL
TIME

1.0000
-0.3254
-0.4722*
-0.4407*
-0.2896
-0.4342*

1.0000
0.9396*
0.9380*
0.7874*
0.9372*

1.0000
0.9576*
0.7502*
0.9492*

1.0000
0.8817*
0.9994*

EDU_ALL

1.0000
0.8947*

TIME

1.0000

67

Table 6: Correlation Output (Macro-level Democratization 1, Significance Level
16%)
HUMAN_~L SOC_OR~L GDPPC_~L URBAN_~L
HUMAN_RIGH~L
SOC_ORG_ALL
GDPPC_ALL
URBAN_POP_~L
EDU_ALL
TIME

1.0000
-0.3254
-0.4722*
-0.4407*
-0.2896*
-0.4342*

1.0000
0.9396*
0.9380*
0.7874*
0.9372*

1.0000
0.9576*
0.7502*
0.9492*

1.0000
0.8817*
0.9994*

EDU_ALL

1.0000
0.8947*

TIME

1.0000

As shown above, the correlation coefficient for HUMAN_RIGHTS_ALL and
SOC_ORG_ALL is negative but not significant at either 5% or 16% level. In other words,
there is little or no correlation between human rights violations and civil society activity.
Correlation coefficients between human rights violations and GDP per capita, urban
population, education and time are all negative and significant at 16% level. The absolute
values of the coefficients are all lower than those in Table 4 with GOVT_APPT being the
proxy for grassroots democratization. In summary, the proliferation of civil society
organizations in China is not associated with a human rights regime and economic
development has had a smaller impact on macro-level democratization (human rights
violations) than on micro-level democratization (competitive village elections).

 Freedom of the Press Index by Freedom House
The Freedom of the Press index assesses the degree of print, broadcast, and internet
freedom in every country in the world, analyzing the events and developments of each
calendar year. Ratings are determined through an examination of three broad categories:
the legal environment in which media operate; political influences on reporting and
access to information; and economic pressures on content and the dissemination of news.
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Under the legal category, Freedom House assesses the laws and regulations that could
influence media content as well as the extent to which the government uses these tools to
restrict the media’s ability to function. The political category encompasses a variety of
issues, including editorial pressure by the government or other actors; censorship and
self-censorship; the ability of reporters to cover the news; and the extralegal intimidation
of and violence against journalists. Finally, under the economic category Freedom House
examines issues such as the structure, transparency, and concentration of media
ownership; costs of production and distribution; and the impact of advertising, subsidies,
and bribery on content. Ratings reflect not just government actions and policies, but the
behavior of the press itself in testing boundaries, even in more restrictive environments.
Each country receives a numerical rating from 0 (the most free) to 100 (the least free),
which serves as the basis for a press freedom status designation of “Free,” “Partly Free,”
or “Not Free.”81
The Freedom of the Press is assessed yearly as a sum of several sub-sections and the
data is available from 1994 to 2001.
Table 7: Correlation Output (Macro-level Democratization 2, Significance Level 5%)
FR~M_ALL SOC_OR~L GDPPC_~L URBAN_~L
FREEDOM_ALL
SOC_ORG_ALL
GDPPC_ALL
URBAN_POP_~L
EDU_ALL
TIME

81

1.0000
0.1150
-0.0551
-0.2397
-0.1230
-0.0973

1.0000
0.9396*
0.9380*
0.7874*
0.9372*

1.0000
0.9576*
0.7502*
0.9492*

http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=274

1.0000
0.8817*
0.9994*

EDU_ALL

1.0000
0.8947*

TIME

1.0000
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The correlation coefficient of interest is 0.1150 between FREEDOM_ALL and
SOC_ORG_ALL. The coefficient is too low to indicate correlation relationship of any
kind. Hence, the result shows that press freedom is not correlated with the development
of social organizations. In other words, the proliferation of civil society organizations is
not associated with freedom of the press in China.
In summary, there is little evidence that a correlation exists between
democratization as represented by the international indices and civil society activity. The
growth of social organizations did not improve democratization on the dimensions of
freedom of the press and human rights violations on the national level. However, it is
worth mentioning that the international indices reflect limited truth. The ratings can be
arbitrary and contain little variation for analysis.
The comparison between the results from Table 3 and the results from Table 5
and 6 suggest that the growth of civil society, indicated by the number of registered social
organizations, has a more certain positive impact on democratization at the grassroots
level (the competitiveness of village elections) than on the national level (the human
rights violations and freedom of press) – assuming the latter are adequate proxies for
democratization at the national level. Therefore, though many social organizations might
have developed strategies to avoid state controls and to turn the “traditional “transmission
belt” function to their own advantage” 82 , as Tony Saich proposes, the overall
democratization has not been initiated in a top-down measure. In other words,
democratization has emerged at the grassroots level but hasn’t progressed enough to
82
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manifest the pattern of change nationally. The final chapter will discuss the further
implications of the results and shortcomings of the study.
The findings provide limited evidence on the positive correlation between civil
society growth and grassroots democratization in China. The correlation is weak but
existent. However, the result has shown no evidence for any correlation between civil
society growth and national-level democratization. In other words, civil society
development is somewhat associated with democratization at the micro-level but not at
the macro-level. The proven positive strong correlation between education level, GDP
per capita and democratization in both micro and macro measures in the previous chapter
suggests that economic development is strongly associated with democracy at the
grassroots level.
The analysis of the international indices for democratization offers limited and
mixed indication that democratization has improved over the years. On the one hand, in
Table 4, the correlation coefficient for human rights violations and time is -0.4342,
significant at 5% level, which shows that with time, human rights violations have
decreased with medium correlation strength of 0.4342. On the other hand, freedom of
press has almost no correlation with time – the correlation coefficient is -0.0973, not
significant at 5% level. The two macro measures of democratization yield different
results and thus no clear evidence shows that democracy measured on an aggregate level
has not developed during the last two decades.
By contrast, grassroots democracy measured by competitiveness of village
elections has unambiguously improved over the same time span. As shown in Table 2,
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the percentage of government appointed candidates negatively correlates with time at a
coefficient of -0.6806, significant at 5% level; the percentage of popular appointed
candidates positively correlates with time at a coefficient of 0.4855, significant at 16%
level. Both correlation coefficients suggest an over-time improvement of grassroots
democracy.
The comparison has led us to believe that in the past two decades since the
implementation of economic and political reforms, democratization has occurred but
restricted at the grassroots level. Moreover, the proven moderate correlation between
civil society development and grassroots democracy and the nonexistent correlation
between civil society development and national-level democracy further prove that civil
society has contributed to the improvement of grassroots democracy but not nationallevel democracy. Can civil society exert impact beyond the grassroots level? Can Chinese
democracy be developed from grassroots to the national level? The final chapter will
discuss further implications of the findings from this chapter and try to debate these
questions.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
The emergence of civil society in China shows that civil society is not an
exclusive property of liberal democracy. Relatively independent social organizations are
able to flourish in the absence of pluralism. Economic and political liberalization in the
post-Mao China has unavoidably encouraged political participation and contestation, at
least at the local level, which appears to have cultivated rights consciousness among
citizens and grassroots activism. Although the development of civil society in
authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia follows a state-led model, I have
provided evidence in Chapter 2 that a genuine social force has developed from below and
started playing a more important role in influencing state policies. The Chinese
government intends to promote civil society for its useful function as a “transmission belt”
between the state and individuals in society. As it delegates more authority to state and
non-state actors at the local level, the central government seeks to reduce its size and
increase its efficiency. At the same time, the authoritarian government does its best to
curb the oppositional power of the emerging social organizations, as the dual registration
system for Chinese NGOs exemplifies. However, the state is finding it increasingly
difficult to assert all-encompassing control over society. Civil society has developed not
only to serve state interests, but also to determine them. The cancelation of a local
hydroelectric project in Sichuan Province following environmental NGO resistance
demonstrates this growing trend.
In China, grassroots activism is linked to grassroots democratization through the
promotion of rights consciousness at the local level. The common assumption in Western
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literature on civil society is that grassroots activism puts pressure on state elites and
contributes to democratic openings that are initiated from the top. In Chapter 3, I outlined
conducts a statistical study that highlighted the relationship between civil society
development and grassroots democratization (micro-level democratization), and between
civil society development and national democratization (macro-level democratization).
The results demonstrate that civil society development has a weak but positive correlation
with micro-level democratization, whereas it has no correlation with macro-level
democratization. The high correlation between micro-/macro-level democratization and
macroeconomic indicators shows that economic development, represented by GDP per
capita, urban population and education level, has had a more obvious impact on
grassroots-level democratization than on national-level democratization. At the same time,
the strong correlation results between micro-/macro-level democratization and time
suggest that micro-level democratization has unambiguously improved over time, while
macro-level democratization has not.
The study unfortunately bears many shortcomings. Firstly, the dataset is small
with only fifteen data points. The number of registered social organizations was either not
recorded prior to 1988 since only in 1989 did the State Council promulgate the
Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Social Organizations, when a new
system of administration of social organizations was constructed. The available data for
village elections is also restricted to the period of 1988 – 2002. International indices on
democracy only provide ratings for China from the 1980’s. There is a simple explanation
for this: before then, China was a totalitarian regime. The small dataset size provides only
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limited evidence of a correlation. Secondly, a study like this cannot tell us anything about
causation. In other words, a correlation between civil society and grassroots democracy
only suggests that the flourishing of civil society has taken place alongside
democratization at the local level. It cannot tell us whether the development of civil
society is a cause for the emergence of grassroots democratization. Thirdly, there are
problems with the data as well. As I discussed in Chapter 3, the government’s tally of
registered social organizations grossly underestimates actual civil society activity in
China. Worse still, it might be misleading – the increasing number probably reflects more
of the state efforts to create GONGOs than the spontaneous grassroots initiatives.
Compared to the proxy for micro-level democratization, international indices on
democracy are not direct measures. Fewer human rights violations and more freedom of
press usually correlate with higher level of democratization, but they are not components
of democracy whereas competitive village election is a component of democracy – free
and fair elections. Moreover, the international ratings are undoubtedly subjective.
The process of constructing such a study has been very challenging since data and
measures were not readily available, and I could not find any previous studies of this kind
to refer to. The results presented in Chapter 3 are far from perfect; however, it is the
closest I can get to an unbiased and useful statistical study on Chinese politics.
Nevertheless, the study does yield meaningful results – it shows that civil society activity
is linked to democratization – but only at the micro-level. As I mentioned in Chapter 1,
whether civil society activity can lead to democratization

depends

on

the

political

structure. In an authoritarian regime, the state may allow grassroots activity as long as it
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does not threaten the government’s rule, which explains the result that civil society
development has no association with macro-level democratization. Does it mean that an
authoritarian political structure is unable to nurture a civil society strong enough to
induce national-level democratization? Or is civil society inherently unable to expand its
influence beyond the local level in the first place?
Obviously, the Chinese party-state is not pursuing modernization and
liberalization to constrain its own power, or cede power to citizens; rather, it is pursuing
these projects to increase its own governing capacity by enlisting social forces and to
strengthen its legitimacy by regulating the otherwise arbitrary behavior of public
officials83. But the debate should focus not on the intentions behind the government’s
economic and political reforms, but on the consequences they have incurred. Michael
Frolic’s argument that civil society in China merely acts as a vehicle of state control is
out of date. In fact, his book chapter “State-led Civil Society” that was published in 1997
and Tony Saich’s book “Negotiating the State” published in 2006 represent two very
different opinions on the development and impact of civil society in China. The former is
pessimistic about civil society’s impact on democratization whereas the latter is more
optimistic. Timothy and Frolic argue that “The prospects for democratic outcomes to
recent social changes, which the model of civil society might have predicted, do not
appear promising at this juncture” 84 . By contrast, Saich contends that civil society
organizations have developed strategies to avoid state controls and that democratization
overall has not been initiated in an exclusively top-down manner. I tend to side with
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Saich, and believe this difference of opinion reflects, at least in part, change in statesociety relations over the past decade. Mary Gallagher writes that social organizations
suffer from a “paradox of legitimacy”: They must get legitimacy from the state and also
need to “find legitimacy within market society”85. However, the latter legitimacy is more
important for their survival in the international environment. Therefore, I would argue
that as China becomes increasingly integrated into the international market economy, the
development strategy for civil society organizations might gravitate towards a greater
reliance on the latter legitimacy – “legitimacy within market society”. In addition, the
data used in the statistical study, however, covers a time span from 1988 to 2002.
Therefore, it is quite possible that the results fail to capture the recent progress in civil
society activity since 2002. If I had been able to include data for recent years, I suspect
the correlation study would have shown a stronger association between civil society
development and macro-level democratization.
Will the Chinese party-state allow even further progress toward a fully
functioning civil society, one that creates unstoppable pressure for democratization,
including rule of law and a multi-party system? Or is there a line beyond which civil
society cannot go? These are important questions, but they beg a more fundamental one:
why does China need a western-style democracy? I think we need to ponder these
questions from a different perspective.
In contemporary political discourse on Chinese democratization, observers have
begun to refer more and more to “One-party Democracy”. Two articles in the New York
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Times have shown that the concept of China’s “one-party democracy” is more popular
now than before. In the September 2009 article86, Thomas L. Friedman calls China as
“one-party autocracy” and the US a “one-party democracy”, criticizing the malfunction
of American democracy: Only the Democrats are making any impact on both the
energy/climate legislation and health care legislation. However, in the January 2010
article87, Roger Cohen raises the question of whether China will ever resemble one-party
democracy. He also writes that “Rightful resistance is growing in China. Citizens
are…using laws to have a say. Nongovernmental organizations are multiplying to
advance agendas from the environment to labor rights”. A simple comparison of these
two articles suggests two things. One is that China may have the tendency towards oneparty democracy over time; the other is that multi-party democracy in a place like the US
might not achieve the extent of party competition that the system promises. Indeed, the
Hotelling Model 88 tells us that two parties have the inclination to merge their party
platforms in the center, producing a single centrist ideology.
China has had some important political developments in recent years. Top
Chinese leaders have started using the term “inner-Party democracy” (dangnei minzhu) to
describe the idea that the party should institutionalize checks and balances within its
leadership89. Two distinct factions within the CCP have emerged: the populist camp led
by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, and the elitist camp led by Jiang Zemin and Li Peng. In
each of the six most important national leadership bodies such as the presidency and the
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Central Military Commission (CMC), the top two positions are now split between these
two factions, creating a built-in system of checks and balances. As Tony Saich points out,
the CCP is currently riven by internal conflict. However, due to the one-party system,
competition within the party and political coalitions still remains largely opaque. If the
competition within the party will continue and the CCP improves the transparency of
factional politics, political lobbies and campaigns might come into being. In addition,
given the large geographical area and ethnic diversity of China, the party-state has seen
increasing competition and conflicts between provinces. The homogeneity of the party
has “become cracked by regionalism, widespread corruption and various forms of local
resistance against the cadre bureaucracy”90. Therefore, competition within the party and
among provinces may be able to serve as a catalyst for viable one-party democratization.
One-party democracy is not unique to China. In fact, its neighbor Japan had a
well-functioning one-party democracy for all but a year between 1955 and 2009, one in
which “Citizens maintain all the usual civil liberties, and non-LDP [Liberal Democratic
Party] parties contest elections, hoping to topple the LDP”91. Evidently, it is important to
point out that considerable opposition and other political parties exist in Japan, whereas
virtually no opposition is present in China. However, the example of Japan shows that it
is possible to have a democracy that is dominated by one party. If a two-party system is
what leads to a single centrist party platform, then maybe one-party democracy is a better
solution since it eliminates the agency costs incurred by political campaigns and interest
group politics, but can at the same time ensure civil liberties for citizens.
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In this sense, micro-level democratization may be as important a measure as
macro-level democratization, if the model of democratization in China is intrinsically
different than that in the West. Regional and local grassroots activism contributes to
rights consciousness as well as political participation and contestation, which puts
pressure on local governments in their policy-making processes. This may cause conflict
between local governments and the state, since local government officials may pursue
policies different than those favored by the central government. Therefore, civil society
activity at the local level can lead to competition and conflict between local governments
and the central government, as well as within the CCP, which is conducive to one-party
democratization.
I am optimistic about the future of China’s democratization and civil society
development. However, to become an optimistic, I have had to change my perspective
and expectation first. Multi-party democracy may just not be in the cards for China. Oneparty democracy seems to be a plausible and achievable political goal in the 21st century,
with the help of an expanding social force bourgeoning from below among its 1.3 billion
people.
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